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7.1  Introduction 
Consider two very similar economies (A and B) in 1970, sharing almost 
all the same markets for inputs and tradables. Economy A has a somewhat 
higher income per capita, an unemployment rate several points higher, 
and, most importantly, substantially lower wage inequality. Now move for- 
ward 20 years to 1990 and reconsider the same economies. The income 
gap has narrowed, but has not been eliminated, and‘  the unemployment 
gap has remained, although both have higher levels. However, the paths 
of income inequality have been quite different. The formerly more unequal 
economy (B) has actually experienced a reduction of inequality over the 
period, while the initially low inequality economy (A) has seen such a large 
increase that their relative positions have been reversed. 
This story does not fit the usual image of the evolution of income in- 
equality during the 1970s and 1980s. A more common impression is that 
the increase has occurred throughout the U.S. economy and even through- 
out the industrialized world. This apparently common experience has ac- 
tually frustrated empirical work into the sources of the overall increase in 
inequality as researchers have  found few  industries and  few  countries 
where the demand for less-skilled workers has increased. 
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Changes in the distributions of log wages (centered moving average over 
The rise in wage inequality in the United  States during the 1980s has 
been well documented (Levy and Murnane 1992). Figure 7.1 shows the 
change in log wages in 1980 and 1990 relative to 1970 for male workers 
from the 5th to the 95th percentiles in the distribution.'  From  1970 to 
1980, wage earners below the 53rd percentile lost ground relative to those 
above them. The largest relative declines occurred in the 15th to 40th per- 
centiles, while the largest relative gains occurred in the 75th to 90th per- 
centile range. In the 198Os, relative wages declined for the bottom two- 
thirds of the distribution, while rising sharply for the top wage earners. 
The relative wage movements remain very similar, even after controlling 
for observable characteristics such as education, race, location, and expe- 
rience, as shown in figure 7.2.2 The bottom half of the distribution de- 
clines, in relative terms, between 1970 and 1980, while fully 80 percent of 
the distribution suffered falling relative wages from 1980 to 1990. 
These striking changes in relative wages have generated a large literature 
by way  of explanation. Indeed, the search for culprits has now extended 
1. The sample is described in section 7.2. The figure shows the relative wage change for a 
particular point in the wage distribution, not for an individual worker. The geometric means 
have been removed for all years. The change in the geometric mean was negative in the 1970s 
and positive in the 1980s. 
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Fig. 7.2  Changes in the distribution of residual wages 
worldwide and a growing body of papers has attributed rising unemploy- 
ment in continental Europe to the same forces that are generating rising 
inequality in the United States and the United Kingdom (e.g., see Berman, 
Bound, and Machin 1997).3 
Is it true that wage inequality increases have occurred throughout the 
industrialized world? Are there actually economies that experienced de- 
clines in wage inequality during this period? In this paper we  argue that 
the rise in wage inequality has been far from uniform among a set of econo- 
mies that are thought to have many more similarities than differences. In 
particular, examples of economies with declining inequality from 1970 to 
1990 are close at hand: Virginia (-7.0  percent), North Dakota (- 5.9 per- 
cent), North Carolina  (-4.0  percent), Hawaii (-4.0  percent), Georgia 
(-3.9  percent), Mississippi (-2.8  percent), and South Carolina (- 1.3 per- 
cent). Economies with dramatically rising inequality over the same period 
include Oregon (24.5 percent), Wyoming (23.2 percent), Michigan (21.9 
percent), New York (20.8 percent), and Pennsylvania (20.5 per~ent).~ 
3. These authors point to inequality increases in some less-developed countries as further 
evidence of the worldwide aspect of this phenomenon. 
4. The inequality measure is the 90-10 difference in log real wages after controlling for 
education, experience, race, and other characteristics. The numbers are the changes in the 
90-10 difference from 1970 to 1990. 230  Andrew B. Bernard and J. Bradford Jensen 
We argue that any theory of the rise in income inequality in the United 
States as a whole should also be capable of explaining the wide variety of 
outcomes across individual states. In this paper we revisit the debate over 
the sources of the increase in wage inequality in the United States by  fo- 
cusing on the evolution of inequality in different labor markets. Prior re- 
search  on inequality  has  almost  always  assumed  that  workers  can  be 
pooled across regions in an attempt to identify sources of the increase in 
relative demand for skilled  worker^.^ A key element in our analysis is the 
extent of integration of U.S. labor markets. If shocks to regions are trans- 
mitted quickly throughout the economy, then regional labor markets will 
provide little additional information in the search for the causes of increas- 
ing wage inequality. However, if  shocks to regional  labor demand  (and 
supply) are only slowly transmitted to the rest of the economy, then we can 
use them to identify important sources of the increases in wage inequality. 
The large literature on wage inequality has identified a set of potential 
culprits. These typically  include (roughly in order of prominence  in the 
literature)  skill-biased  technological change  (Bound  and Johnson  1992; 
Katz and Murphy  1992; Berman, Bound, and Griliches  1994), interna- 
tional trade (Borjas and Ramey 1994, 1995; Wood 1995), immigration (To- 
pel  1993), and labor market  institutions such  as unions  and minimum 
wage changes (DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996; Fortin and Lemieux 
1997). One difficulty that previous researchers have encountered is the ap- 
parently ubiquitous rise in inequality both within and between groups of 
workers  and industries. This has led  to a general  consensus among re- 
searchers that changing demand across industries, with the possible excep- 
tion of international trade, has not played a significant role in the rise in 
wage differentiak6 Examples of these conclusions appear frequently in 
the literature on wage inequality: 
It is clear that not very much of the wage changes of the 1980’s can be 
explained . . . by changes in the industrial wage structure or in the inci- 
dence of unionism. It is necessary  to focus . . . on changes in relative 
competitive wage levels. (Bound and Johnson  1992, 380) 
Measured changes in the allocation  of labor demand between sectors 
. . . can account for a large minority of the secular demand shifts in 
5. Bound and Holzer (1996) also use the PUMS from the Decennial Census to examine 
the importance of regional shocks on college/high school and blacwwhite wage differentials. 
They find important effects from local demand shocks as well as supply effects from migra- 
tion at the top end of the wage distribution. Additional work using regional data to examine 
inequality include Topel (1993) and Borjas and Ramey (1995). The former uses broad re- 
gional measures to discuss the impact of immigration on wages. The latter uses wage data 
on metropolitan areas to assess the effect of foreign competition on the returns to education. 
6. Based on anecdotal evidence (questioning economists at conferences), we  have found 
widespread, if not universal, agreement with the proposition that cross-industry effects are 
not a significant source of increased inequality. However, it is hard to get individual research- 
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favor of groups with rising relative wages. . . . The majority of the re- 
quired demand shifts in favor of more-educated workers and females 
reflect difficult to measure changes in within-sector relative labor de- 
mand. (Katz and Murphy 1992, 76) 
. .  . we  find that less than one-third of the shift of employment from 
production  to  non-production  workers  can  be  accounted  for  by 
“between-industry’’ shifts. . . . (Berman, Bound,  and Griliches  1994, 
368) 
In their survey article, Levy and Murnane conclude emphatically: “How- 
ever, the plight of young, less educated males cannot be viewed primarily 
as a consequence of deindustrialization. Declines in the relative demand 
for less educated workers occurred within industries-most  dramatically 
within manufacturing where semiskilled jobs declined at a much faster 
rate than overall manufacturing employment” (1992, 1372). 
Subsequent  research  has  often  started  from  the  assumption  that 
industry-level changes in  demand  are at best  small contributors to the 
overall rise in inequality. However, almost all of the previous work on the 
inequality rise has focused on the longitudinal aspects of any given data 
set and ignored variations across geographic units. 
Why  have economists concluded  that changing industry mix, and in 
particular the loss of manufacturing jobs, was not a major factor in the 
inequality rise? Research on the rise in inequality has been quite careful 
about creating appropriate groups by worker characteristics (industry, oc- 
cupation, education, experience, race, and sex) with the notable exception 
of location. Katz and Murphy (1992), in their highly influential paper on 
the topic, divide workers into 12 industries, three occupations, and eight 
gender-education groups. All these, however, make no distinction for the 
location of the individual-an  appropriate assumption if wages and em- 
ployment are determined by national integrated labor markets. 
In this paper, we construct measures of inequality for each state in the 
United States. While the identification of individual states with separate 
labor markets is not ideal,’ the extent to which individual states experience 
distinct shocks to the labor market will allow us to identify the importance 
of those shocks in the widening of the income distribution. One caveat con- 
cerns aggregate shocks that do not differ across states. Krugman (1995) 
and Berman, Bound, and Machin (1997) argue that skill-biased technolog- 
ical change has been pervasive, both within countries and across coun- 
tries. In our approach, we  will miss aggregate shocks that move the wage 
distribution homogeneously across states. 
We  concentrate on a set of guiding questions. Does the level of wage 
7. Identifying Connecticut as a distinct labor market from those in New York, Massachu- 
setts, or Rhode Island is not correct. This distinction is perhaps still preferable to assuming 
that the market for labor in Connecticut is integrated with Georgia, Arizona, and so on. 232  Andrew B. Bernard and J. Bradford Jensen 
dispersion vary across regions? Are increases in inequality uniform across 
states? Are increases in inequality proportional to initial inequality? Does 
this heterogeneity across regions allow us to identify the sources of rising 
inequality? 
The plan for the paper is quite simple. We start by assessing the assump- 
tion  that regional labor markets are not well  integrated,  at least in the 
short or medium term. Then, we  provide evidence on the large variation 
in inequality of both returns to observable characteristics such as educa- 
tion  and residual wage inequality  (unobservable characteristics)  across 
states at any point in time. We then document the variation in the changes 
of state residual wage inequality from 1970-90 and attempt to associate 
these movements with common explanations for the inequality rise. 
7.2  Evidence on the Integration of U.S. Labor Markets 
A key assumption we  will maintain in searching for causes of the rise 
in wage inequality is that labor markets in the United States are integrated 
only in the long run. There is little recent research on the extent of the 
integration of labor markets across regions in the United States. Blanchard 
and Katz (1992) consider the consequences of state-specific shocks on the 
paths of unemployment, wages, and migration over various time horizons. 
While their conclusions support the argument that labor markets are in- 
tegrated in the long run (beyond  10 years), there are substantial distur- 
bances to local labor markets in the short and medium term. Blanchard 
and Katz find that the effects of an employment shock on the unemploy- 
ment  rate peak at 2 years and are completely dissipated after 6 years. 
Wages show a more  persistent  response  with the maximal decline oc- 
curring 6 years after a negative employment shock and some effects linger- 
ing for more than 10 years. 
We provide two additional pieces of evidence on the integration of re- 
gional labor markets. First, we calculate the returns to different levels of 
education in each state. Strongly integrated state labor markets should not 
display large, persistent differentials in education returns. Next, we  esti- 
mate the relative impact of regional and industry employment shocks to 
plant-level wages. If integration fails in the near term, we hypothesize that 
regional employment shocks should have a stronger and more immediate 
impact on wages than industry shocks. 
7.2.1  Persistence of Education Premia 
For our state-level analyses, the data on wages come from the Public 
Use Micro Samples (PUMS) from the Decennial Censuses of 1970, 1980, 
and 1990. The samples of the population available for those years are 1 
percent, 5 percent, and 5 percent, respectively. We restrict our attention to Understanding Increasing and Decreasing Wage Inequality  233 
the real weekly wages of nonimmigrant adult males, ages 18-65  inclusive, 
employed 14 weeks or more during the year and not self-employed.  We use 
a simple wage regression, estimated separately for each state for each year.8 
(1)  In W W = f( g (experience), race, education, weeks worked, location), 
where g (-)  is a quartic in experience and there are two dummy variables 
for race (black and Hispanic) and four for education (no high school de- 
gree, some college, college degree, advanced degree [6+ years of tertiary 
education]). The location variable is a dummy for residents outside a stan- 
dard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA). 
The education premia are percentage differences from the wages of  a 
male worker with a high school degree in the same state and are reported 
in table 7.1. The premia show substantial heterogeneity across states. In 
1970, workers with a college degree, on average, earned 55 percent more 
than high school graduates in South Dakota, but only 28 percent more in 
Utah. The mean state wage premium for a college degree in 1970 was 43 
percent and the standard deviation across states was 5.9 percent. Similarly, 
in 1970, the negative effect of not finishing high school ranged from -  11 
percent in Nevada to -34  percent in Tennessee. 
In  1990, education premia  continued to show  substantial dispersion 
across states. The wage premium for a college degree ranged from 27 per- 
cent in Wyoming to 52 percent in Texas. The mean and standard deviation 
across states were 43 percent and 6.2 percent, respectively. The range of 
premia across states was substantial for all levels of education for all years, 
suggesting that, at any time, regional labor markets support very different 
relative returns to education. 
The existence of different education premia in any year might be ex- 
plained by temporary shocks to the regional labor markets. However, the 
premia  are also quite persistent over time. Correlations across decades 
typically range from 0.5 to 0.8.9 Except for the “some college” category, 
all the education premia show significant positive correlations over time. 
Figures 7.3 and 7.4 show the “advanced degree” and “no high school de- 
gree” premia. This evidence suggests that even during 10- or 20-year inter- 
vals, labor markets in different states do not adjust to equate the returns 
to education.1° 
8. Our specification of the log wage regression follows that often employed in the literature 
on inequality (see Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1993; Gottschalk 1997). 
9. The single exception is “some college,” where the correlation was 0.04 between 1970 
and 1980. This result is driven largely by Wyoming and Alaska. 
10. One objection to this interpretation is that the variation  in  state education premia 
merely reflects the quality of education provided in the state, which is itself persistent over 
time. Table 7.1  Education Premia by State (“h) 
Advanced Degree 
No High School Diploma  Some College  College Degree  (6+ years) 















































































-  19.7 
-27.5 
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-  20.4 
-17.4 
10.5  17.2 
9.0  5.9 
10.2  9.2 
12.7  5.2 
12.3  8.3 
10.0  7.3 
9.9  8.4 
8.9  7.2 
9.8  6.2 
13.6  8.5 
13.9  9.5 
8.8  8.6 
7.6  8.3 
3.4  4.5 
11.0  7.1 
9.8  6.0 
7.4  7.6 
10.6  6.8 
5.4  7.4 
9.1  8.7 
10.9  6.9 
7.9  9.2 

































































































































































35.1 MN  -23.2 
MO  -23.8 
MS  -25.1 
MT  -23.1 
NC  -24.5 
ND  -20.3 
NE  -24.2 
NH  -17.5 
NJ  -20.2 
NM  -24.3 
NV  -16.5 
NY  -24.8 
OH  -22.8 
OK  -23.5 
OR  -19.5 
PA  -20.0 
RI  -21.7 
sc  -25.8 
SD  -22.8 
TN  -27.9 
TX  -27.1 
UT  -26.4 
VA  -25.5 
VT  -24.0 
WA  -22.8 
WI  -24.1 
wv  -24.3 
WY  -21.5 
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7.5  8.1 
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9.9  5.8 
10.3  7.3 
7.9  3.5 
12.3  7.1 
9.2  4.3 
10.9  7.7 
5.9 
12.7  9.0 
13.2  7.8 
3.9  4.5 
11.7  9.1 
9.0  8.6 
7.2  7.8 
8.2  4.7 
8.5  4.5 






























42.6  32.6 
44.2  34.0 
40.5  34.7 
29.3  22.3 
50.2  44.0 
40.0  34.1 
41.5  35.4 
42.2  35.7 
48.2  41.2 
45.6  34.8 
35.4  29.7 
50.0  39.2 
46.6  31.6 
45.5  37.2 
33.9  24.4 
49.2  36.1 
42.7  35.3 
46.8  39.7 
39.4  - 
49.2  39.5 
52.4  38.8 
31.5  26.1 
50.4  42.8 
30.4  31.8 
37.6  28.7 
39.3  28.4 
40.4  30.9 





























60.1  39.8 
62.0  37.7 
55.3  39.4 
46.0  29.3 
61.8  50.4 
52.3  31.9 
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59.0  43.3 
66.0  54.6 
71.0  47.4 
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51.5  33.7 
56.5  32.2 
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Fig. 7.3  Persistence of advanced degree premium 
7.2.2  State and Industry Employment Shocks 
We  use  plant-level  data  from  the  manufacturing  sector  to  explore 
whether industry or regional employment shocks have a greater impact on 
wages. We make use of the plant-level data from the Annual Surveys of 
Manufactures (ASM) from 1972 to 1987, which cover wages and employ- 
ment and include approximately 50,000 plants each year. We  estimate an 
equation of the form Understanding Increasing and Decreasing Wage Inequality  237 
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Fig. 7.4  Persistence of no high school degree premium 
(2) 
where A In  w,,~,  is the percentage change in wages at plant p in (two-digit) 
industry  i in  state s from time (t - 1) to t;  A  lnN,,es,t  is  the change in 
employment in the industry outside the state; A InN,,,, is the change in 
employment in the state outside the industry; d, is a vector of time dum- 
Alnw,,,  =  4 +  A(JWln~&,&,  +  B(L)AlnN,,,&,  +  EtSP‘’ 238  Andrew B. Bernard and J. Bradford Jensen 
mies; and E,~~~  captures all other shocks to the plant. We  include nine an- 
nual  lags of  the employment  changes  to allow  for  slow adjustment  of 
wages. The dependent variable is the percentage change in the average real 
wage per worker at the plant less the average change across all plants. For 
each plant, the state employment shocks are constructed as the percentage 
change in employment in the state outside the two-digit-level industry of 
the plant. Similarly the industry shock is the percentage change in employ- 
ment in the same two-digit-level industry outside the state. Both types of 
employment shocks are adjusted to be mean 0 in given year. 
In using this specification, we  are making the assumption that shocks 
to individual plants are small relative to the labor market as a whole. In 
addition, we are assuming that annual changes in the wage are driven ex- 
clusively by shocks to  labor demand. If, as  we suspect, labor-demand shocks 
to the region  regardless  of industry are relatively more important than 
nationwide industry labor-demand shocks, we should expect to see larger 
coefficients on recent lags of the state employment  changes, and lower, 
delayed responses to industry employment changes. 
The results for the regression are presented in table 7.2 and the cumula- 
tive effect of a 1 percent negative employment change is shown in figure 
7.5. The response path for the two types of wage shocks is quite different 
and in accord with the prediction that regional labor markets clear much 
more quickly than national labor markets. Wages immediately fall more 
than twice as much in response to a state employment shock than an in- 
dustry shock. The wage response to a 1 percent decrease in state employ- 
ment peaks at 0.21 percent after 3 years before gradually diminishing. In- 
dustry shocks are fully felt only after 8 years. The response of plant wages 
confirms our hypothesis that labor markets clear only locally in the short 
run and that shocks are transmitted nationally only after long delays." 
In this section, we have assembled evidence that state labor markets are 
not well integrated in the short or medium term. The persistence of re- 
gional employment shocks on relative wages, the magnitude and persis- 
tence of the state education premia,  and the relative importance  of re- 
gional rather than industry shocks to employment on local wages all lead 
us  to conclude that  shocks to state labor markets will  have  important 
effects on the level and distribution of wages. 
7.3  Returns to Observable Characteristics 
The literature on rising wage inequality has identified several distinct 
trends in the data. As noted by numerous authors, the overall increase in 
wage dispersion consists of at least two distinct phenomena.  One is the 
increase in returns to observable worker characteristics such as experience 
11. We have also run the plant-wage regressions including shock to the own-industry state. 
The results do not change. Understanding Increasing and Decreasing Wage Inequality  239 
Table 7.2  Response of Plant Wages to Employment Shocks 
Dependent Variable: 
Change in Plant Average Wages 
(t -  1 to t) (%) 
Coefficient  t-statistic  P 
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Notes:  State employment change is the percentage change in employment in the state exclud- 
ing the industry. Industry employment change is the percentage change in employment in 
the industry outside the state. All changes are normalized to be mean 0 in every year. 
and education. The second is the dramatic rise in within-group inequality, 
called returns to skill. In the rest of this paper, we  concentrate almost ex- 
clusively on the increase in the returns to unobserved skill and leave aside 
the issue of the increasing returns to education. Since, by definition, skill 
is not directly observable, we follow others in the labor literature (see Juhn, 
Murphy, and Pierce 1993; Gottschalk 1997) and calculate the returns to 
skill as the residual from a standard wage regression. 
We  again estimate the wage regression separately for the 3 census years, 
pooling the data across states, but allowing for variation in  state mean 
wages.'* The wage regression is of the form given in equation (1) and the 
results are given in table 7.3.13 
12. This might seem odd after our discussion of the magnitude of state education premia. 
However, none of the results on residual wage inequality are sensitive to whether we estimate 
individual state regressions or a pooled national regression. 
13. Allowing for interaction terms between the experience function and other variables 
did not change the results on residual inequality. 240  Andrew B. Bernard and J. Bradford Jensen 
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Fig. 7.5  Response of plant wages to regional and industry employment shocks 
(cumulative effect of a 1 percent decline in employment) 
The well-known pattern of returns to observable characteristics is evi- 
dent in these regressions. In 1970, relative to high school graduates, men 
without high school diplomas earned almost 22 percent less, while college- 
degree holders earned almost 44 percent more. Men with some college 
earned a more modest wage premium of 11 percent, while individuals who 
acquired additional tertiary education gained on average an extra 5 per- 
cent above college-degree holders. Observables explain 3 1 percent of the 
overall variation in log wages in 1970.14 
In general, the 1980 results confirm prior research and show a modest 
decline in the premium  for tertiary education relative to high  school- 
diploma holders, as well as a slight worsening of the relative position of 
men without high school diplomas. By 1990, however, the returns to edu- 
cation had changed significantly. The wages for men without a high school 
diploma had decreased further, while the returns to a college degree rose 
over 10 percent, and the returns for further tertiary education had jumped 
almost 20 percent. In 1990 observable characteristics explained 40 percent 
of overall wage variation, a sizable increase from both 1970 and 1980. 
14. Throughout this paper, we restrict our discussion to the education variables among 
observable characteristics. Understanding Increasing and Decreasing Wage Inequality  241 
Table 7.3  Wage Regressions (log real weekly wages) 




































































































Note: State dummies included. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
7.4  Residual Wage Inequality: The Nation 
While the regressions in table 7.3 show part of the story of the increase 
in inequality, the bulk of the variation in wages remains unexplained by 
observable worker characteristics. Increasing returns to education explain 
only part of the overall increase in wage inequality. From the regressions, 
we calculate the distribution of the wage residual and consider the changes 
in the distribution over the period. We consider three measures of the re- 
sidual distribution of log weekly wages, the 90-10 wage differential, the 90- 
50 wage differential, and the 50-10 wage differential. 
The first half of table 7.4 reports the levels and changes in those measures 
for the 3 years and two intervals from the pooled national regression. Given 
the large literature on the increase in within-group inequality, it is not sur- 242  Andrew  B. Bernard and J. Bradford Jensen 
Table 7.4  Changes in Residual Wage Inequality 
1970  1980  1990 
90-10  ratio 
Change 
90-50  ratio 
Change 
50-10  ratio 
Change 
90-10  ratio 
Change 
90-50  ratio 
Change 
50-10  ratio 
Change 
Pooled Nutionul Regressions 
1.164  1.209 
0.045 
0.512  0.535 
0.023 
0.652  0.675 
0.023 
Separate State Regressions 
1.151  1.202 
0.051 
0.507  0.531 
0.024 














prising that we  also find a large increase in residual wage inequality as 
measured by  the 90-10 differential in the 1970s (4.5  percent), and espe- 
cially in the 1980s (7.3 percent).15 Changes in the  1970s are split evenly 
between increases at the top and bottom, while during the 1980s increases 
in inequality at the top half of the distribution were twice as large as those 
in the bottom half. 
In the second half of table 7.4, we compute our three residual inequality 
measures  after allowing all the returns to observable characteristics  to 
vary across states. This specification lets us see how much of the increase 
in inequality is due to state-specific changes in the returns to age, educa- 
tion, and so on. Allowing the returns to individual characteristics to vary 
across states does reduce residual wage inequality for the country as a 
whole. However, the magnitude of the reduction is quite small and the 
changes over time are unaffected. For the remainder of the paper, we con- 
sider only the distribution from the pooled regression. 
7.5  Residual Wage Inequality: The States 
Thus far we  have confirmed the rise in returns to education over time 
as well as the increase in residual inequality at the national level during 
both the  1970s and the  1980s. However, in section 7.2, we  argued that 
while regional labor markets are integrated over long horizons, they dis- 
play substantial evidence of segregation in the short and medium run. To 
use  the information on individual states, we  construct measures of the 
90-10 differential for every state (plus the District of Columbia) in each of 
15. These increases are somewhat smaller than those reported elsewhere (e.g., Katz and 
Murphy 1992). This difference is most likely due to the fact that we allow the coefficients on 
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our 3 years (see table 7.5). While the national 90-10 differential was 1.164 
in 1970, the same measure for the states ranged from 1.013 in Connecticut 
to 1.188 in Oklahoma (the median state) to 1.369 in Louisiana and a phe- 
nomenal  1.634 in Alaska. The average state 90-10 difference was  1.195 
with a cross-state standard deviation of 1  1.4 percent. 
The figures for 1980 and 1990 show similar heterogeneity across states. 
In 1980, residual inequality ranged from 1.086 in New Hampshire to 1.215 
in Utah (median) to 1.603 in Alaska. The state mean had increased to 
1.222 with a drop in the standard deviation to 9.1 percent. Ten years later, 
the average 90-10 differential had increased dramatically to 1.274 and the 
dispersion remained relatively unchanged (8.3 percent). As with the edu- 
cation premia, the returns to unobserved skill varied widely across states 
in every year. 
7.5.1  Increasing and Decreasing Inequality 
The variation in the levels of inequality across states dwarfs the changes 
in national inequality over time. In any of the 3 years, a large number of 
states have 90-10 differentials substantially above or below the national 
average. In addition, states follow very different paths over time both in 
terms of levels and rankings. Georgia starts with the 9th highest level of 
inequality in  1970, but by  1990 Georgia ranks 32nd and inequality has 
fallen almost 4 percent in the state. In contrast, New York moves 25 places 
from 15th lowest to 12th highest with an increase of more than 20 percent 
in the 90-10 differential. In fact, the changes in state wage inequality show 
at least as much heterogeneity as the levels themselves. 
While there is no doubt that residual inequality was rising at the na- 
tional level during the 1970s, 18 states actually experienced a decline in 
inequality during the decade (see table 7.6). At the other extreme, 6 states 
had inequality increases at twice the national rate. Even during the 1980s, 
a time of dramatically increasing inequality for the country as a whole 
(7.3 percent), 2 states saw inequality decrease, and 7 others had increases 
of less than 3 percent. In fact, 36 states had slower inequality increases 
than the nation. For the entire 20-year period, while  the national 90-10 
residual increased over 11 percent, 7 states had net declines in inequality. 
The locations of states with the highest and lowest inequality changes can 
be seen clearly in figure 7.6. In both decades, states with larger black circles, 
representing those with the largest rises in inequality, are geographically 
clustered around the Great Lakes. On the other hand, the states with the 
lowest inequality rises, or decreases, are more likely to be in the Southeast. 
Increases in inequality are correlated in the 1970s and 1980s. States with 
higher-than-average inequality increases in the  first decade were  more 
likely to also have above-average increases in the 1980s (see fig. 7.7), but 
they explain only 27  percent of  the overall variation in state inequality 
growth in the 1980s. Table 7.5  Wage Inequality 90-10 Differentials 
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Nore: Residuals from national-level regressions. Table 7.6  Changes in Wage Inequality 90-10 Differentials 
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Fig. 7.6  Changes in inequality 
Note: Actual dot sizes vary continuously. The legend provides three reference points. Understanding Increasing and Decreasing Wage  Inequality  247 





Fig. 7.7  Persistence in inequality changes 
7.5.2  The Extreme States and Their Importance 
Table 7.6 reports the state changes in wage inequality sorted by perfor- 
mance during each decade. The 12 extreme states, 6 with big increases and 
6 with declines or small increases, are in boldface. The differences between 
the two groups are striking. The six with the biggest increases in the 1980s 
(New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Ohio, and Minnesota) are 
all large industrialized states that suffered disproportionately from the re- 
cession in the beginning of the decade and lost a large number of manu- 
facturing jobs. The six best performers (Delaware, Mississippi, Alabama, 
Maryland,  Virginia, and Georgia) are mostly  southern  states  that  ex- 
panded manufacturing employment during the decade. 
While there is little doubt that states experienced very different changes 
in residual inequality, it does not immediately follow that this heterogene- 
ity was important for the national increase. To quantify the importance of 
the individual states, we  calculate the 90-10 differential with and without 
the groups of states that had the biggest and smallest changes. Table 7.7 
reports the 90-10 differentials for all states together and two groups of 44 
(one without the top 6 and one without the bottom 6). 
Excluding the 6 states with the lowest growth in wage inequality, the 
overall increase for the United States would have been 19.6 percent higher 
during the 1970s and 9.6 percent higher in the 1980s. The states that had 
the largest increases in wage inequality during the 1980s had an even larger 
effect on the aggregate measure. Inequality increases would have been 36 
percent lower in the 1970s and 23 percent lower in the 1980s without the 248  Andrew B. Bernard and J. Bradford Jensen 
Table 7.7  Impact of States with Largest and Smallest Inequality Increases 
1970  1980  1990 
90-10 Difference  (levels) 
All states  1.164  1.210  1.282 
Excluding six smallest  1.154  1.209  1.289 
Excluding six largest  1.204  1.228  1.285 
90-10 Difference  (changes) 
All states  0.046  0.073 
Excluding six largest  0.025  0.056 
Excluding six smallest  0.055  0.080 
Table 7.8  Mean Reversion in State Residual Wage Inequality 
Dependent Variables 
Inequality Change,  Inequality Change, 
1970-80  1980-90 
Intercept  0.536  0.241 
(6.406)  (2.928) 
Initial inequality  -0.428  -0.154 
(-6.083)  (-2.272) 
R2  0.429  0.080 
N  49  49 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
increases in these 6 states. These results suggest that the heterogeneity in 
state outcomes was an important determinant of national inequality. 
7.5.3  Mean Reversion 
It is possible that the heterogeneity in state outcomes merely represents 
a mean reversion to a common level of inequality. Regressing the change in 
inequality on the initial level, we find that in the 1970s states with higher- 
than-average initial levels of inequality showed decreases, or smaller in- 
creases, while low-inequality states tended to experience more rapid in- 
creases (see table 7.8). States with 10 percent higher initial levels in  1970 
had, on average, a 4.3 percent lower rise in inequality over the following 
decade. Initial levels explain over 40 percent of the variation in state per- 
formance.I6 
In contrast, in the 1980s initial levels explain only 8 percent of the subse- 
quent movement in inequality across states. The relationship between ini- 
tial wage differentials and subsequent changes was still negative, but on 
16. When additional variables are added to the specification, the coefficient on lagged 
levels is no longer negative for either decade. Understanding Increasing and Decreasing Wage Inequality  249 
average a 10 percent higher initial wage differential in 1980 was associated 
with only a 1.5 percent lower increase over the following decade. We can 
conclude that  the variation  in state performance in  the  1980s was not 
simply a result of mean reversion in inequality. 
7.6  The Explanations 
The preceding sections show that shocks to regional labor markets per- 
sist over the short and medium run and that states had vastly different 
outcomes in terms of wage inequality during the 1970s and 1980s. In this 
section, we reconsider existing explanations of the rise in wage inequality 
using state-level data. As mentioned at the outset, the dominant explana- 
tions for the national inequality increase center on the use of skill-biased 
technology, changes in product demand due to international trade, supply 
shifts due to immigration, and shifts in labor market institutions. We con- 
struct state-level variables to proxy for each of the explanations. 
7.6.1  Skill-Biased Technological Change 
One problem with the hypothesis that skill-biased technological change 
has been the source of the rise in overall wage inequality is the lack of direct 
evidence. Krueger (1993) argues that the use of computers is associated with 
a wage premium, but DiNardo and Pischke (1  997) offer a compelling ar- 
gument that computers themselves have not changed the wage structure. 
Since we do not have direct measures of technology either by state or for 
individual workers, we follow Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) and 
Bernard  and Jensen (1997) in using measures of the capital stock as a 
proxy for inputs that are complements to skills. A further limitation of 
these measures is that they are only available for the manufacturing sector 
from the ASM and Census of Manufactures, and as a result may not capture 
technology upgrading in other sectors.” With these caveats, the hypothesis 
of skill-biased technological  change  implies a  positive relationship  be- 
tween increases in capital per worker and inequality within the state. 
We consider two measures of skill-biased technology for each state, the 
log levels of machine and equipment stocks per worker in the manufactur- 
ing sector in the state (Machine)  and the log level of computer investment 
per worker in manufacturing in the state (Computer). The data are con- 
structed from the preceding Census of Manufactures (i.e., the 1967 census 
for 1970, the 1977 census for 1980, and the 1987 census for 1990).18 
17. In an alternative view of skill-biased technological change, Acemoglu (1998) models 
the increase in skill-biased technology as an endogenous response to the supply of skills. If 
he  is  correct, our measures of computers and machines will not correctly proxy for the 
changes in skill-biased technology. 
18. The computer investment data are not available for 1970. 250  Andrew B. Bernard and J. Bradford Jensen 
7.6.2  International Trade 
Ideally we  would be able to measure import and export prices for all 
goods produced in a state. Instead we use state-level import and export ex- 
change rates (Import and Export).  To calculate the import exchange rate for 
a state, we  start by constructing industry import exchange rates for each 
four-digit manufacturing industry. The industry import exchange rates are 
given by  the sum of real exchange rates indices (U.S. dollars/foreign cur- 
rency)I9  across countries weighted by  that country's average share in im- 
ports in the industry over the preceding 3 years, 
(3) 
The state import exchange rate is the weighted sum of industry import 
exchange rates with the weights given by the share of the industry in total 
shipments from the state, averaged over the sample, 
(4)  ' ~.  Tvs~',l  EXCHIM,. 
' TVSd 
The expected relationship between the state import exchange rate and in- 
equality  is negative. A  strengthening  dollar means cheaper imports in 
goods that are produced  in the state. If a state contains industries that 
experience substantial import penetration, and imports are generally pro- 
duced with less-skilled labor, then state-level inequality should rise. 
The state export exchange rate is constructed in a comparable fashion: 
The state export exchange rate is the weighted sum of industry export 
exchange rates with the weights given by the share of the industry in total 
exports from the state,'O 
x, = c  ~.  Exps~'  EXCHEXI  . 
,  EXPs 
CVD  x, = c  ~.  EXCHEXI. 
,  EXPs 
If  exports are skill-intensive products, as found in  Bernard and Jensen 
(1995, 1997) we  should expect to see a positive relationship between the 
state export exchange rate and inequality. 
The main difficulty with both exchange rate measures stems from the 
19. The exchange rates are nominal exchange rates deflated by  GDP deflators in foreign 
20. Due to a lack of state industry export data in earlier years, we  are forced to use weights 
currency per US. dollar normalized to be 100 in 1980. 
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inequality data itself. Since we only observe states in 3 years, our exchange 
rate measures may not capture the effects of the dollar movements in the 
first half of the 1980s. 
7.6.3  Industry Composition 
To capture changes in the composition of output at the state level, we 
include a measure of durable manufacturing employment for the state. 
Specifically we  calculate the ratio of durable manufacturing employment 
to total employment in the three census samples (Durable).  The pictures 
of the wage inequality changes in figure 7.6 suggest that manufacturing- 
intensive states saw disproportionate rises in wage inequality. We expect 
that changes in durable employment would be negatively correlated with 
inequality changes. 
Another measure of product demand is  the level  of government pro- 
curement in the state. The measure is constructed from the government 
procurement data of Hooker and Knetter (1997) and is given by the log 
level of government procurement expenditures per capita (Procure).  Since 
the government contracts captured in the data tend to be for large skill- 
intensive products, the expected relationship with inequality is positive. 
7.6.4  Immigration 
To evaluate the potential role for foreign immigration in depressing low- 
skilled workers’ wages and thus increasing inequality, we include the ratio 
of recent immigrants to the population (Immigrant).  Immigrants are those 
workers who immigrated to the state within the last 5 years of the prior 
decade.21  The expected relationship of immigration and inequality is posi- 
tive if the pool of immigrant labor is generally less-skilled than the existing 
stock of native workers.22 
7.6.5  Labor Market Institutions 
Recent work by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) and Fortin and 
Lemieux (1997) has revived interest in labor market institutions as sources 
of inequality increases. Lee (1 999), using state-level data, argues that all 
the increase in raw inequality can be attributed to changes in state mini- 
mum wages. In particular, the decline in unionization rates and the fall in 
the real minimum wage are offered as important explanations for the rise 
in wage dispersion. We construct measures of unionization rates (Union) 
for each state for the 3 years.23  The data on unionization rates come from 
21. For example, for the 1980-90  changes in inequality, the immigration measure is calcu- 
lated as fraction of the state population who immigrated to the state in 1985-90. 
22. Immigrants may have lower apparent skills in the data due to language problems or 
discrimination even if their actual skill levels are higher than the native population’s. 
23. Barry Hirsch generously provided files with the unionization  data. For early years, 
some states appear only in groups. We assigned the group unionization rate to the state for 
those years. Since both sets of data start in 1973, we  use the 1973 values for 1970. 252  Andrew B. Bernard and J. Bradford Jensen 
Kokkelenberg and Sockell (1985) and Hirsch and Macpherson (1993). The 
minimum wage data come from Neumark and Wascher (1992). We  use 
the log of the real state minimum wage as our measure (Minwage). 
7.6.6  Income Levels 
To  capture the possibility that heterogeneity in  state inequality mea- 
sures is being driven by  variations in state income levels, we  construct a 
measure of state economic activity. For each state we  calculate the differ- 
ence between the median income and the national median income (Cycle). 
In our estimation framework, including state fixed effects, we expect that 
higher state incomes would be correlated with peaks in the state business 
cycle and associated with lower levels of inequality. 
7.7  Explaining State Inequality Changes 
Ideally any explanation for the large rise in inequality during the 1980s 
would be capable of explaining smaller increases in other periods. For our 
estimation procedure, we  choose to pool the data across decades instead 
of estimating decade-by-decade  regression^.^^ We estimate the relationship 
between our explanatory variables and state residual wage inequality, as 
measured by  the log 90-10 ratio, in levels, pooled across years with state 
fixed effects.25 
Table 7.9 contains univariate regressions of state inequality on each of 
our explanatory variables in columns (1) through (10). Almost all the vari- 
ables are significantly correlated with inequality changes and have the ex- 
pected sign. The measure of durable employment share is negatively and 
significantly correlated with changes in inequality across states (col. [  11) 
and can explain almost 30 percent of the variance over the 2 decades. A 
1 percent change in the fraction of the sample employed in manufacturing 
is associated with a 1.58 percent increase in the 90-10 ratio. 
Both measures of technology deepening, log capital per worker and 
computer investment per worker, are positively correlated with inequality 
across states. The capital-intensity measure by itself accounts for over 20 
percent of the variation, while for the 1980s computer-investment changes 
can explain over 40 percent of the total state heterogeneity.26 
Deunionization  is also strongly correlated with increasing inequality. 
Decline in union membership rates can account for almost 30 percent of 
the variation in the pooled estimation. The minimum wage measure does 
the best of all the state-level measures. It is strongly negatively correlated 
with increases in inequality and accounts for 45 percent of total variation. 
24. In table 7.11 below, we also report estimates for changes during the 1980s. 
25. Pooled estimation in first differences across the decades does not yield different conclu- 
26. The computer measure is not available before 1980. 

































0.29  0.21  0.42b  0.14  0.00  0.29  0.45  0.04  0.18  0.04 
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Notes: All regressions were estimated using state fixed effects. South Dakota is missing from the population census for 1980 and Hawaii is missing in all years 
from the Longitudinal Research Database. Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
"Residuals from log wage regression. 
bThe computer numbers are not available for 1970. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
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Increased immigration also shows up with a positive and significant CO- 
efficient, although its overall explanatory power is low. Similarly, our mea- 
sure of aggregate state economic activity confirms that states moving from 
business-cycle troughs to peaks have declines in inequality, although the 
measure cannot explain much of the cross-state variation in the 2 decades. 
Surprisingly, our measures of international trade do not perform well. 
The import exchange rate has the wrong sign, the appreciation of the dollar 
on an import basis leads to declines in inequality, and the export exchange 
rate is not signifi~ant.~~  The measure of government purchases per capita 
is significant, but unexpectedly negatively correlated with inequality. 
These univariate results suggest that a wide range of potential explana- 
tions may play a role in the increase in inequality. Changes in minimum 
wage, decreases in durable-manufacturing employment, decreases in union- 
ization, and increases in capital per worker all have substantial explana- 
tory power. However, one drawback  of the specification in  table 7.9 is 
that we have neglected to control for time effects; that is, any unobserved 
aggregate trending variable could be driving movements in both our left- 
hand-side and right-hand-side variables. We would like to know how ro- 
bust the univariates are in the presence of time trends. 
Table 7.10 reports the same set of regressions with time dummies (i.e., 
separate time trends for each decade). The differences in the results are 
quite substantial. Of the previously significant regressors, only durable 
employment and the business-cycle measure  remain  statistically signifi- 
cant. In addition, the coefficient on the export exchange rate switches to a 
negative sign and becomes significant, suggesting that depreciations that 
stimulate exports may reduce inequality.28  In other words, only changes in 
durable employment and business cycles are correlated with differential 
movements in inequality across states within decades. In particular, the 
prior significance of the state minimum wage was due almost entirely to 
its aggregate trend movements and not due to variation across states. 
We consider a multivariate specification with all our potential explana- 
tory variables in table 7.1 1. Columns (1) and (2) report pooled results for 
both decades without and with time dummies, respectively, while columns 
(3) and (4) report results just for the 1980s. In all specifications for both 
time periods,  the share of durable-manufacturing employment and the 
state of the state business cycle enter significantly and with the expected 
sign. Declines in durable-manufacturing employment are strongly associ- 
ated with inequality increases, even allowing for the presence of alternative 
27. We caution that this does not mean that international trade was unimportant for in- 
equality increases. The decade-long span of our data may hide the role of trade. Preliminary 
work looking at state-level foreign direct investment shows mixed results. 
28. Bernard and Jensen (1997) find that exporters contribute to increases in wage differen- 
tials between production and nonproduction workers. However, this may reflect changes in 
education premia as opposed to changes in residual wage inequality. Table 7.10  Explaining Changes in State Residual Wage Inequality (with year dummies) 
~~ 
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Table 7.11  Explaining Changes in State Residual Wage Inequality 
Dependent Variable [log (state 90-10 ratio)p 
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Notes:  All regressions were estimated using state fixed effects. South Dakota is missing from 
the population census for 1980 and Hawaii is missing in all years from the Longitudinal 
Research Database. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
'Residuals from log wage regression. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
explanatory variables. Similarly, state business-cycle expansions are asso- 
ciated with declines in residual inequality, and recessions are times of in- 
creasing inequality. The state minimum-wage measure is again significant 
only in the specifications without time trends. Of the other explanatory 
variables, measures of capital intensity, immigration, exchange rates, union- 
ization, or government procurement, none is close to being significant, 
except for the import exchange rate measure in the 1980s, which has the 
wrong sign. 
7.8  Inequality at the Top and Bottom 
The preceding results focused on changes in the log 90-10 ratio of resid- 
ual wages. In this section, we  explore what differences, if any, result from 
looking at changes in the top and bottom halves of  the residual wage Understanding Increasing and Decreasing Wage Inequality  257 
distribution. Table 7.12 reports specifications for the 90-50 and 50-10 in- 
equality measures with and without time trends. All regressions are pooled 
over both decades, estimated in levels with state fixed effects. 
The results for the 90-50 ratio are in columns (I) and (2) of table 7.12. 
Increases in inequality in the upper  half of  the residual wage  distribu- 
tion  are  significantly negatively  correlated  with  the  share of  durable- 
manufacturing employment, although  the point  estimates are less than 
one-half those of the entire distribution. In the specification without time 
trends, we  also find  significant effects of  immigration and the two  ex- 
change rates. The exchange rates have the expected sign, a strengthening 
dollar increases inequality through imports, but a weakening dollar in- 
creases inequality through exports. Surprisingly, the minimum-wage mea- 
Table 7.12  Explaining Changes in State Residual Wage Inequality 
Dependent Variables" 
log (state 90-10 ratio)  log (state 50-10 ratio) 































































































Notes: All regressions were estimated using state fixed effects. South Dakota is missing from 
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Research Database. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
'Residuals from log wage regression. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
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sure enters with the expected sign and significantly. We suspect this result 
is, again, due to decade trends, as most, if not all, economic theories would 
suggest that changes in the minimum wage should not affect this part of 
the wage distribution. The state of the business cycle, while significant for 
changes in the 90-10 differential, does not affect dispersion at the top of 
the distribution. 
Looking at the results for the 50-10 ratio in columns (3) and (4) we  find 
some surprising differences. Overall, our set  of  variables explains less 
of the cross-state inequality movements in this part of the distribution. 
Durable-manufacturing employment, as always, is negative and strongly 
significant with a much larger coefficient. However, increases in inequality 
at the bottom of the skill distribution are not significantly correlated with 
either the measure of technology, the exchange rate measures, or changes in 
state minimum wages. In addition, the coefficient on immigration has the 
opposite sign from what we might expect and is marginally significant. The 
business-cycle measure is now strongly significant with the expected sign. 
Taken as a group, these results confirm the importance  of  durable- 
manufacturing employment in accounting for inequality changes through 
the skill distribution. They also highlight the relative importance of busi- 
ness cycles on wage movements in the bottom half of the distribution. The 
results for state minimum wages largely confirm our earlier findings and 
suggest that minimum-wage changes are not driving large increases in in- 
equality. 
7.9  Conclusion 
In this paper, we  argue that the previous research on wage inequality in 
the United States has largely overlooked an important source of informa- 
tion, the heterogeneity of inequality movements across regions.29  We  sus- 
pect this oversight stems from an assumption that individuals participate 
in a single national labor market. If there is one nationwide market setting 
wages,  then there is no reason to look at regional data to understand 
sources of the rise in wage inequality. If, however, regional labor markets 
experience idiosyncratic shocks that are only slowly transmitted to other 
areas, then we  can potentially learn about the sources of inequality from 
the experiences of different regions. 
We find that the assumption of a single national labor market fails in 
the data. Blanchard and Katz (1992) show persistent effects of state em- 
ployment shocks. In addition, we find that education premia show large, 
persistent differences across states, suggesting that flows of workers and 
29. As mentioned earlier, important exceptions are Bound and Holzer (1996), Borjas and 
Ramey (1994, 1995), and Topel (1993). Understanding Increasing and Decreasing Wage Inequality  259 
firms are not sufficient to eliminate wage differentials. Finally, we  show 
that regional employment shocks have large effects on plant-level wages.30 
The story that emerges from most of the prior literature on wage in- 
equality in the United  States is one of a remarkably consistent increase 
during the 1970s and 1980s across and within groups (industries, educa- 
tion categories, etc.). The state-level data provide a very different view. 
Measures of  state inequality  show a  remarkable  variety  of  levels  and 
changes over time. In any given year, numerous states have levels of in- 
equality far from the national average in both directions. More impor- 
tantly, the relative positions of the states change sharply from decade to 
decade. Numerous states with above-average inequality in  1970 end up 
being relatively equal 20 years later, and some states even improve their 
absolute positions over the period. 
This variety of outcomes at the state level provides a natural environ- 
ment for reexamining the existing theories for the overall inequality rise. 
To evaluate existing theories of the rise in inequality, we  construct state- 
level measures of industrial composition, skill-biased technology, interna- 
tional trade shocks, and labor market institutions. 
Among our results, one fact is clear. The decline in the share of durable- 
manufacturing employment  is negatively correlated  with  inequality  in- 
creases in all our specifications, over all periods, and for every segment 
of the residual wage distribution. By  itself, the share of durable-manu- 
facturing employment can account for 30 to 55 percent of the state changes 
in wage inequality and is especially important for movements in the bot- 
tom half of the wage distribution. 
The most surprising failure in our state regressions are our measures of 
international trade and weighted state import and export exchange rate 
indices, which are not significant and usually are the wrong sign. On the 
other hand, while immigration is not important for changes in the 90-10 
ratio, increased foreign immigration is positively correlated with inequality 
increases in the upper half of the skill distribution, and negatively corre- 
lated in the bottom half. 
The evidence collected here is a useful starting point for reconsidering 
possible explanations for the large increase in inequality in the 1980s, and 
the smaller but significant increases in the returns to skill in the  1970s. 
Unlike previous research on inequality increases, we  find an important 
role for the decline of manufacturing employment. These results suggest 
the importance of understanding the sources of and variation in manufac- 
turing employment declines. While international trade appears not to have 
played a direct role in the inequality rise, its role in changing the com- 
30. We encourage further research on the integration of regional labor markets, whether 
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position of production remains to be explored. On a more positive note, 
the results also suggest that, to the extent that manufacturing employment 
has stabilized, the increases in residual wage inequality should slow as well. 
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Comment  Lee G. Branstetter 
Introduction 
This interesting paper is the latest in a series of interesting papers gener- 
ated by the productive collaboration of Andrew Bernard and Brad Jensen. 
I found this to be a provocative and well-executed piece of research, and 
I suspect that this paper may be one of the most important contributions 
that will emerge in this volume. While, in keeping with the traditional re- 
sponsibilities of a discussant, I will raise some questions about the authors’ 
approach and results in these comments, I should stress at the outset that 
I like this paper very much. I should also issue a disclaimer: I am neither 
a labor economist, nor an “expert” in the debate over the sources of  in- 
creases in U.S. income inequality. Therefore, the authors and the reader 
should apply the appropriate discount factor to all that I am about to say. 
The authors’ starting point is the observation that, while the inequality 
of income distribution in the United States has widened substantially over 
the last decade, the direct causes of this increase have eluded the collective 
research efforts of some of the brightest minds working in economics. The 
estimated effects of the usual suspects-international  trade, deunioniza- 
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tion, and minimum wage changes-can  explain only a portion of this in- 
crease. The rest is attributed to “skill-biased technological change,” but 
this attribution has come about more through a process of elimination of 
alternatives than on the basis of direct evidence. 
Can  economic analysis at the  regional level  help us disentangle the 
causes of  changes in the income distribution at the national level? The 
promise of this idea is that there is considerable variation across states, 
not only in levels of inequality and their potential determinants, but also 
in the rates of  change of  these variables over time, which could be ex- 
ploited to improve identification. Of course, there are also costs to this ap- 
proach. One cost comes from the data: The authors have only three cross 
sections of census data to work with, whereas, for instance, Katz and Mur- 
phy (1992) had annual data from the 1960s through the 1980s, which al- 
lowed them to look closely at the dynamics of labor market adjustment. 
Here data availability precludes such an analysis of dynamics. More sub- 
stantively, U.S. states are really not like miniature countries, nor is  the 
United States like a state within a larger supranational economy.’ For this 
and other reasons, extracting lessons for national policy from the experi- 
ence of individual states may prove problematic.2 
Nevertheless,  a  number  of  researchers  have  sought  to  understand 
changes in the wage distribution by looking at regional economic develop- 
ments, including Tope1 (1986,  1994), Bound and Holzer (1996), Borjas 
and Ramey (1995), and others. These papers have tended to measure in- 
equality by examining the returns to education. Bernard and Jensen make 
a valuable contribution to this line of research by focusing on state-level 
changes in residual wage inequality. This approach certainly has promise. 
After all, international economists and growth specialists have learned 
much through empirical work at the state and local levels. Such geographic 
disaggregation may prove to be even more useful in economic analysis of 
increasing income inequality. 
Are States the Appropriate Unit of Analysis? 
Given the potential advantages of geographically disaggregating the na- 
tional economy, the first challenge we  come up against is how to define 
1.  Products and capital move much more freely across state borders than across many 
national borders, and the associated forces of factor-price convergence are likely to be orders 
of magnitude stronger within than across countries. Even labor, relatively immobile though 
it is, is much more mobile within the United States than it is across national borders. Finally, 
as Paul Krugman (1996) and others have pointed out, for all of the talk of globalization, the 
US. economy remains in many ways a closed system, since the vast majority of goods and 
services consumed within its borders are also produced there. This is much less true of indi- 
vidual states, even less true if the level of analysis is the MSA. 
2. Bernard and Jensen argue that “any theory of the rise in income inequality in the United 
States as a whole should also be capable of explaining the wide variety of outcomes across 
individual states.” I think this might be asking a bit too much from any theory we are likely 
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regional economies. Are states the appropriate units? To their credit, the 
authors have obviously thought about this issue, and readily admit the 
problems of using state data. I think this issue is important enough to 
merit some additional comment here. 
The obvious advantage of states is that much data is available at the 
state level because states are important political units within the U.S. fed- 
eral governmental structure. However, there can be considerable diversity 
within as well as between states. I am not just talking about the obvious 
differences between urban and rural labor markets (are labor market con- 
ditions more similar between San Francisco and the Central Valley than 
they are between San Francisco and Boston?). In their study of college 
wage premia at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level, Borjas and 
Ramey  (1995) document  nontrivial  differences across  different  urban 
areas within the same state! Moreover, the political boundaries between 
states often do not correspond very well to the contours of regional econ- 
omies. Casual empiricism suggests that California contains at least two 
regional economies, northern  California  and southern California,  with 
different patterns of specialization in production  and possibly different 
business cycles. At the other extreme, casual empiricism can also identify 
groups of states that are obviously highly integrated, such as the Tri-State 
region surrounding metropolitan New York. 
Different papers in this literature have taken different approaches to this 
problem. Robert Tope1 has looked at agglomerations of states (regions), 
while Bound and Holzer (1996) and Borjas and Ramey (1995) have looked 
at MSAs. The fact that these papers have come to different conclusions 
about the sources of changes in regional income inequality suggests the 
answers one gets may be somewhat dependent on the level of aggregation 
at which one conducts empirical analysis. All that being said, I must say 
that states strike me as a completely logical place to begin. 
Do State-Level Labor Markets Exist? 
Taking the state as the appropriate unit of analysis, the authors note 
that looking at state-level data only makes sense if the level of integration 
across states is limited, at least in the short to medium term. The authors 
offer three pieces of evidence concerning this claim. First, the authors cite 
the well-known study by Blanchard and Katz (1992). This study indicates 
that the migration of workers across state boundaries mediates shocks to 
employment over horizons of 6-10  years. It seems to indicate that state- 
level labor markets only exist in the medium run, rather than the long run. 
To  provide additional support for limited integration across states, the 
authors show that returns to education differ substantially across states. 
This is a striking piece of evidence. However, some care needs to be taken 
in interpreting these numbers. What the coefficients on education actually 
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schooling and income for a cross section of residents of a particular state 
at a particular time. The wages of highly educated current residents are 
measured relative to the less-educated current residents of that state. Of 
course, many current residents were educated outside the state of current 
re~idence.~  Furthermore, this measure will  probably be higher in states 
with more unequal income distributions. 
What these coefficients do not measure are the alternative real wages 
that could be earned by a given individual with a given level of education 
and quality, who is contemplating a move to a different state. Imagine an 
MIT Ph.D. choosing among California, Michigan, and Texas-her  deci- 
sion will be influenced by where her wages are the highest, not where high 
school dropouts have the lowest relative wages. Another way of thinking 
about this question is to ask what we might expect a “perfectly integrated” 
labor market to equalize. The answer is fairly complicated-the  after-tax, 
“cost-of-living’’ adjusted real wage  for individuals with identical educa- 
tiodskill levels (which is not necessarily well captured by “years of school- 
ing”), adjusting for noneconomic amenities (California sunshine or the 
indignity of being represented by certain politicians in Washington) that 
are likely to differentially impact utility for different education groups, up 
to the fixed cost of migrating across states. In other words, it is not clear 
that even perfectly integrated national labor markets would equalize the 
education premia that the authors measure. Nevertheless, I do believe that 
the differences in these measured premia are so large that they are very 
difficult to reconcile with any notion of a well-integrated national labor 
market, even in the medium to long run. 
For skeptics not convinced by  these first two pieces of  evidence, the 
authors undertake some original empirical analysis using the ASM data 
in  defense of  their proposition of limited interstate integration of  labor 
markets. They compute the relevant impact of industry and state employ- 
ment shocks on average wages at the plant level, finding that plant-level 
wages tend to respond more quickly and to a greater extent to state em- 
ployment shocks (employment changes outside the two-digit industry of 
the plant) than to industry shocks (nationwide employment in the same 
two-digit industry outside the state). I would have thought that plants 
adjust employment rather than wages, especially in the short term.4 I also 
3. These coefficients are also possibly affected by different levels of educational quality 
across states, as the authors suggest, but they do not measure these levels of quality. In order 
to do that, one would need information on where a person was educated as well as where 
they currently lived. David Card and Alan Krueger (1992) present evidence on the returns 
to education in different states-their  evidence suggests that, at least historically, important 
quality differentials have existed. 
4. Given the way  plant-level wages are computed,  these measured wage changes could 
reflect changes in the composition of employees rather than a change in the marginal wage 
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harbor some reservations about these results due to the fact that many 
industries are geographically concentrated. Krugman (1996) has suggested 
that this concentration is evidence of agglomeration externalities. Regard- 
less of the reason, the fact of geographic concentration of industries seems 
fairly well established. I am therefore a bit surprised that the data seem to 
have so little trouble differentiating between state employment shocks and 
industry employment shocks. (It seems that a major downturn in the aero- 
space industry  should have  some impact  on  the  state of  Washington, 
just as the oil price declines of the mid-1980s induced a regional slump 
in Texas and Oklahoma.) Nevertheless, I do not dispute the results-yet 
more evidence that there is but limited integration of local labor markets 
in the short to medium run. 
Residual Inequality at the State Level and Its Causes 
Having offered evidence on limited labor-market integration, the au- 
thors then construct measures of  “residual inequality” (changes in the 
log wage ratio of the 90th percentile and the 10th percentile of the wage 
distribution, controlling for the effects of education and demographic fac- 
tors) at the state level. These measures have changed over time in dramati- 
cally different ways  in different states. In fact, for me,  the most striking 
feature of the paper was the contrast between the declining residual in- 
equality in some southern states (-7  percent for Virginia) versus explod- 
ing inequality in some northern states in the old manufacturing belt (21.9 
percent for Michigan and 20.8 percent for New York) and the West. A 
whole research agenda could be built around exploring and explaining 
these differences, which to my knowledge are documented for the first time 
in this paper. I hope that the authors will proceed full speed ahead in this 
direction, and I look forward to reading their future papers on this topic. 
I have one concern about these numbers, however. Residual income in- 
equality is only one component of the total increase in wage inequality 
observed in the United States over the last 2 decades. We  need to keep 
this in mind in our subsequent discussion of the authors’  result^.^ On a re- 
lated note, I would like to point out that, as the authors freely admit, they 
are not weighting by  population in any sense. Their striking results may 
be driven by  big changes in small (less populous) states. Not that this is 
not interesting, but the implications for the U.S. economy as a whole will 
be different in this case. On the other hand, the authors present evidence 
in  section 7.5.2 that  suggests the  extreme  states  are collectively large 
enough to have had some impact on overall national trends. 
The variable that stands out as explaining the changes in residual wage 
5. Virginia may have undergone a decline in the level of residual income inequality, but 
according to the authors’ figure 7.3, its advanced degree premium-an  alternative measure 
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inequality across states is the (change in) percentage  of  the state labor 
force enployed in durable-goods manufacturing. Somewhat surprisingly, 
measures of  migration and international exposure seem to matter little, 
but this measure of changes in the industry composition of employment 
has very large and very robust effects on local income inequality. The po- 
tential implications of this finding are hard to overstate. Careful research 
at the national level has consistently failed to find any strong relationship 
between changes in income inequality and changes in the pattern of labor 
demand across industries.'j In this paper, at the state level, the authors are 
able to identify such a linkage in their data. The authors suggest that this 
is evidence that changes in demand for labor across industries really do 
have a powerful impact on inequality. They tell a story of manufacturing 
relocation from the Midwest to the South that is consistent with the data. 
An Alternative Explanation? 
Does durable-goods manufacturing really move the wage distribution? 
Perhaps so. I must admit to have been so brainwashed by the accumulated 
evidence against industry composition being important that I am not eas- 
ily persuaded. Let me suggest an alternative story, which is actually not 
my  own-rather,  it is a restatement of Bound and Holzer's (1996) story 
based on their analysis of regional labor markets at the SMSA level and 
the work of Tope1 (1986). It focuses on labor supply considerations, which 
are, I think, somewhat in the background in this paper. I should say that 
I myself do not put too much stock in this alternative scenario, but it is at 
least worth thinking about. 
Let us suppose that Blanchard and Katz (1992) are right-interstate 
migration does act to smooth shocks. However, the propensity to migrate 
is quite different for educatedhkilled workers than for uneducatedhn- 
skilled workers; it is higher for the more-educated and better-skilled work- 
ers. This has implications for the wage distribution following a shock to 
the local economy, whether we measure this by the college wage premium 
(picking up the returns to educational attainment) or residual wage in- 
equality (picking up, at least in part, the returns to skill, broadly defined). 
Wage adjustment will  fall more heavily on the less-mobile workers. So, 
less-skilled workers in the southern boomtowns have their wages bid up, 
less-skilled workers in  the North have their wages pushed down. Obvi- 
ously, expectations about the duration of the shock affect the migration 
response. But it is not too hard to tell a story of Midwest versus South in 
which asymmetric responses to different overall demand shocks, rather 
6. This failure is one important reason why the economics profession has been skeptical 
about the popular linkage between the rise of manufactured goods imports and the declining 
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than changes in industry composition, tell the story. And the convergence 
of the southern regional economy toward national levels of income and 
capital per worker, if nothing else, could drive these kinds of changes. How 
do I explain the big effects of durable goods? I would have to argue that 
it is picking up other factors. Durable goods is such a broad aggregate of 
economic activity that the argument is not impossible to make, but it is 
not easy either. Furthermore, this alternative explanation may not be con- 
sistent with the facts. The authors have told me that a more inclusive mea- 
sure of immigration from other states proved insignificant in earlier regres- 
sions, which  would certainly  go  against  this  story. Bound  and Holzer 
(1996) have found substantial effects from migration on the college wage 
premium, using data at the MSA level, but this does not insure that migra- 
tion would have similar effects on residual inequality at the state level. 
Implications for the Increase in Inequality at the National Level 
I would like to end this review with the same question I posed in the 
introduction: Can an examination of changes in income inequality at the 
regional level help us understand changes in the income distribution at the 
national level? Here the authors’ findings are extremely provocative but, 
perhaps, not quite conclusive. Nevertheless, as the authors of this paper 
have measured it, a very large portion of the increase in residual inequality 
can evidently be explained by changes in industrial structure, and that, in 
itself, could turn much of what has been written about increasing income 
inequality on its head. 
In fact, the basic message and ultimate impact of this paper may go well 
beyond the relatively narrow question I posed in my  introduction. The 
balance of the evidence presented in this paper strongly suggests that re- 
gional labor markets are much less strongly integrated at the national level 
than most of the economics profession had previously assumed, despite 
high levels of interstate migration and more less or less perfectly free trade 
of goods and services across state lines. At the very least, these findings 
need to be further explored and explained. Their implications may inform 
not only our understanding of changes in income inequality, but also our 
understanding  of  the  roles  of  distance  and  political  borders  in  intra- 
national as well as international trade, and the limits this may place on 
the level of intranational economic integration and, even, the definition of 
national economic policy. I look forward to the next paper by  these au- 
thors on this topic. 
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